The Macroeconomics of Knowledge Management: Internal Hold-Up versus Technological Competition

Thierry Verdier
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mathias Thoenig

No 4710, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper investigates the links between the nature of contractual relationships within firms, the strength of information flows spreading between firms and the dynamics of technological competition. At the firm level, we focus on the corporate incentives to design Knowledge Management policies based on soft versus hard information flows. At the aggregate level, knowledge spillovers are endogenous and feedback effects on macroeconomic growth are investigated.

Keywords: Knowledge management; Organizational design; Hard-soft information; Growth hold-up (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L16 L20 O30 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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