The Macroeconomics of Knowledge Management: Internal Hold-Up versus Technological Competition
Mathias Thoenig () and
Thierry Verdier ()
No 4710, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
This Paper investigates the links between the nature of contractual relationships within firms, the strength of information flows spreading between firms and the dynamics of technological competition. At the firm level, we focus on the corporate incentives to design Knowledge Management policies based on soft versus hard information flows. At the aggregate level, knowledge spillovers are endogenous and feedback effects on macroeconomic growth are investigated.
Keywords: growth hold-up; hard-soft information; knowledge management; organizational design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L16 L20 O30 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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