Competition and Imports in the European Market

Alexis Jacquemin and Andre Sapir

No 474, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Theoretical and empirical research suggests that import competition within European markets imposes a major constraint on domestic firms's price-cost margins. The programme for the completion of the European Community's (EC) internal market by 1992 is largely based on the effects expected from a reinforcement of such a constraint. But imports from the rest of the world could also exercise an important trade discipline on European market performance. In fact there are various arguments suggesting that the disciplinary effect of extra-EC imports could be stronger than that of intra-EC imports. The paper develops an empirical model to measure the relative strength of import discipline on price-cost margins in European industries. We find that both potential and actual competition induced by imports are effective in narrowing such margins. Furthermore, trade discipline varies not only according to various features of industry but also according to the origin of imports: only extra-EC imports were found to exercise a significant impact on price-cost margins.

Keywords: Commercial; European Integration; Imperfect Competition; Import Competition; Market Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=474 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition and imports in the European market (1991)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:474

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... pers/dp.php?dpno=474

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().