Anti-Dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment
David Collie and
Hylke Vandenbussche ()
No 4780, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
The Byrd amendment to US anti-dumping law distributes the revenue from anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign firms to the domestic firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. This Paper shows that the presence of the Byrd Amendment can yield lower duties and greater welfare than in its absence. This result holds when the US government puts a sufficient weight on the profits of the domestic industry in the welfare function. A sufficient condition for this result is that the market share of the domestic industry exceeds 50%, which applies in most US anti-dumping cases.
Keywords: dumping; tariffs; US trade policy; world trade organisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org
Working Paper: Anti-dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4780
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=4780
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().