Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development

Torsten Persson ()

No 4938, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The paper combines insights from the recent research programs on constitutions and economic policy, and on history, institutions and growth. Drawing on cross-sectional as well as panel data, it presents new empirical results showing that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. non-democracy) has important consequences for the adoption of structural polices that promote long-run economic performance. Reforms into parliamentary (as opposed to presidential), proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies.

Keywords: Economic performance; democratic institutions; growth promoting policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F43 H11 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (132)

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Working Paper: Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development (2005)
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