The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting

Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén

No 4954, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper, we evaluate the impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting. The aspects that we discuss are decision-making efficiency and the distribution of power in the EU's leading decision making body the Council of Ministers. We compare two alternative Council voting rules: those accepted in the Treaty of Nice and implemented by the Accession Treaty of ten 2004 entrants and the rules that are laid down in the Constitutional Treaty.

Keywords: Eu; Turkey; Voting; Constitutional treaty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 F02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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