Can we Trust Private Firms as Suppliers of Vaccines for the Avian Influenza?

Rikard Forslid

No 4980, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Using a simple monopoly model, this note analyses the incentives of a vaccine producer. Because a vaccine tends to eradicate the disease for which it is intended, it also tends to destroy its own market. This means that monopolistic producers may be tempted, in a socially non-optimal way, to delay the introduction of vaccines against new infections until the disease has spread.

Keywords: Vaccines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D62 H10 I18 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Can We Trust Private Firms as Suppliers of Vaccine for the Avian Influenza? (2006)
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