Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative

Stephanie Rosenkranz and Utz Weitzel

No 5067, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players? decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as being trustful. We argue that the cooperative aspect relates to incentives while the trustful (and thus non-calculative) aspect of the decision is related to the framing of the situation.

Keywords: Trust; Framing; Focal points; Alliances; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D80 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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