EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Intertemporal Speculation, Shortages and the Political Economy of Price Reform: A Case Against Gradualism

Sweder van Wijnbergen

No 510, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: How should countries like Poland or the USSR move towards price flexibility, gradually or in a `big bang'? Why is it that governments committed to eventual price flexibility so often seem to be unable to let go of `temporary' controls? How can one explain that after price increases early in a programme of price controls, one often sees output rise while at the same time shortages also seem to increase? This paper argues that intertemporal speculation, hoarding and the political economy of price reform go a long way towards explaining all these puzzles. We show that the interaction between shortages and political vulnerability of reformist governments to early perceptions of failure make for a strong argument against gradualism in the decontrol of prices.

Keywords: Credibility; Intertemporal Speculation; Liberalization; Price Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=510 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:510

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... pers/dp.php?dpno=510

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:510