Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective

Luis Garicano and Richard Posner

No 5186, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Two recent failures of the United States intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We use insights from organizational economics to analyse the principal organizational issues raised by these commissions.

Keywords: Organizational economics; Intelligence reform; War on terrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 D8 H1 K0 L22 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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