Individual vs. Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth

Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter and Lena Edlund ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nils-Petter Lagerlöf

No 5474, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Marrying individuals' consent has been requirement for marriage in Europe since the Middle Ages - in most of the rest of the world parental consent reigned until at least until the 1950s. This paper investigates the role of consent in marriage for intra-household allocation of resources and growth. We argue that a shift from parental to individual consent moves resources in the same direction, favouring young men and young women over old men. If young adults have greater incentives to invest in child human capital than the old (who will be around fewer periods), this may impact on growth. We formulate a simple endogenous growth model capturing these aspects.

Keywords: Individual consent; Love marriage; Parental consent; Arranged marriage; Endogenous growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 O17 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-edu and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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