Israel, the Palestinian Factions and the Cycle of Violence

David Jaeger and M. Daniele Paserman

No 5498, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this study we extend our previous work to examine the dynamic relationship between violence committed by Palestinian factions and that committed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We find a statistically significant relationship between Israeli fatalities claimed by groups associated with the ruling political party, Fatah, and subsequent Palestinian fatalities. We do not find a similar relationship for Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian factions. We conjecture that these differences are due to the different positions of the factions vis-Ã -vis bargaining over a two-state solution to the conflict as well as the organizational structures of the factions.

Keywords: Intifada; Terrorism; Conflict resolution; Bargaining; Violence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C32 D71 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence (2006)
Working Paper: Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence (2006)
Working Paper: Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence (2005)
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