Does Central Bank Transparency Reduce Interest Rates?
Sylvester Eijffinger,
Petra Geraats () and
Carin Cruijsen
No 5526, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Central banks have become increasingly transparent during the last decade. One of the main benefits of transparency predicted by theoretical models is that it enhances the credibility, reputation, and flexibility of monetary policy, which suggests that increased transparency should result in lower nominal interest rates. This paper exploits a detailed transparency data set to investigate this relationship for eight major central banks. It appears that for all central banks, the level of interest rates is affected by the degree of central bank transparency. In particular, the majority of the improvements in transparency are associated with significant effects on interest rates, controlling for economic conditions. In most of these cases, interest rates are lower, often by around 50 basis points, although in some instances transparency appears to have had a detrimental effect on interest rates.
Keywords: Central bank transparency; Monetary policy; Interest rates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fmk, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5526 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5526
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5526
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().