Strategic Complementarities in Multi-Stage Games

Xavier Vives

No 5583, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We provide sufficient conditions in finite-horizon multi-stage games for the value function of each player, associated to extremal Markov perfect equilibria, to display strategic complementarities and for the contemporaneous equilibrium to be increasing in the state variables.

Keywords: Markov game; Supermodularity; Two-stage game; Adjustment costs; Learning curve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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