On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict

Wilbur Coleman and Francesco Caselli

No 5622, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.

Keywords: Ethnic distance; Exploitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P48 Q34 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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Related works:
Journal Article: ON THE THEORY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT (2013)
Working Paper: On the theory of ethnic conflict (2013)
Working Paper: On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict (2008)
Working Paper: On the theory of ethnic conflict (2007)
Working Paper: On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict (2006)
Working Paper: On the theory of ethnic conflict (2006)
Working Paper: On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict (2006)
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