The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe

Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli

No 563, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper studies how the creation of a European Central Bank (ECB) will change the political economy of monetary policy in Europe. The 12 governors of the EC member countries national central banks of the EEC have recently proposed a statute which delineates the institutional structure of the ECB. In this paper, we discuss the likely impact of this proposed structure on the conduct of monetary policy at the European level, particularly from the point of view of the trade-off between inflation and stabilization. We analyse the role of the political independence of the ECB and the effect on policy choices of voting rules for appointing ECB board members

Keywords: Central Bank Independence; ECB; European Monetary System; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=563 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe (1991)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:563

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... pers/dp.php?dpno=563

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().