Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals

Nauro Campos and Horváth, Roman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roman Horvath

No 5673, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We construct objective measures of privatization, internal and external liberalization reform efforts, across countries over time, and investigate their determinants, reversals and macroeconomic impacts. We find that GDP growth determines external liberalization and privatization, concentration of political power drives internal liberalization, and democracy underpins all three. We find that FDI inflows reduce the probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal liberalization reversals, and OECD growth increase that of external liberalization reversals. We replicate previous studies and find that the macroeconomic effects of reform (when measured objectively) tend to be larger and more precisely estimated.

Keywords: Political economy; Transition; Reform; Privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E23 H26 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals (2009)
Working Paper: Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals (2006)
Working Paper: Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals (2006)
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