Sovereign Debt Restructuring: the Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights

Marcus Miller and Dania Thomas

No 5710, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What are the implications for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity ? between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement ? to promote a swap with a supermajority of 76% of creditors. Our analysis of Argentine debt litigation reveals a process of 'judge-mediated' sovereign debt restructuring, which resolves the key issues of Transition and Aggregation - two of the roles envisaged for the IMF's still-born Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). For the future we note how the judge-mediated sovereign debt restructuring, together with creditor committees, may complement the market-based alternative promoted by the Treasury, namely collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts.

Keywords: Sovereign debt restructuring; Holdout creditors; Collective action clauses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 K41 K49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights (2007)
Working Paper: Sovereign debt restructuring: the Judge, the vultures and creditor rights (2006)
Working Paper: Sovereign debt restructuring: the Judge, the vultures and creditor rights
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