Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable?
Paola Conconi (),
Carlo Perroni and
No 5761, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions. On one hand, governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates. On the other hand, they are unable to commit to future policies and, once capital has been installed, have incentives to increase taxes. In this setting, there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions. We compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios: no tax harmonization (all countries set taxes unilaterally), global tax harmonization (all countries coordinate their capital taxes), and partial tax harmonization (only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes). We show that, if capital is sufficiently mobile, partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization. Our analysis provides a rationale for the proposed creation of an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement on capital taxes within the European Union.
Keywords: commitment; partial coordination; tax competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 F21 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org
Journal Article: Is partial tax harmonization desirable (2008)
Working Paper: Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable? (2008)
Working Paper: Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable? (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5761
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=5761
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().