When Anti-Dumping Measures Lead to Increased Market Power: A Case Study of the European Salmon Market

Frode Steen and Frank Asche

No 5781, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper we apply the Bresnahan-Lau (1982) model to test for market power in the European distribution of salmon. In this particular setting, the model also incorporates a test of whether dumping takes place over time. Utilising data at the import level, derived demand equations are specified rather then consumer demand. From 1997 a so-called salmon agreement that implied minimum prices, a growth ceiling and a feeding restriction program for Norwegian farmers was imposed. Here we test whether the agreement resulted in an increase in the Norwegian market power. The results suggest that Norway did not have market power prior to the salmon agreement, and we find no indication that dumping was taking place. However, the agreement led to Norwegian market power after 1997. It is interesting to note that the agreement was initiated to prevent anti dumping duty of 13% that Norwegian farmers would have to pay otherwise. The increase in mark-up from imposing the agreement is found to be in the order of 14-15%, suggesting that the Norwegian farmers saved a fee of 13% and gained a markup that was even higher.

Keywords: Anti-dumping; market power; Salmon markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C22 C32 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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