Computing Abuse Related Damages in the Case of New Entry: An Illustration for the Directory Enquiry Services Market

Georges Siotis and Maite Martinez Granado
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Maite Martinez-Granado ()

No 5813, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs) market to competition. In Spain, both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. The latter abused its dominant position by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the subscribers? database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. We use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share substantially below what it would have obtained in the absence of abuse.

Keywords: Competition policy; Abuse of dominance; Telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C22 L41 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse and nep-reg
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Working Paper: Computing abuse related damages in the case of new entry: An illustration for the Directory Enquiry Services market (2006)
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