CEO Power, Compensation and Governance

Rui Albuquerque and Jianjun Miao

No 5818, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favour one or the other type of compensation. The model explains why good countrywide investor protection breeds good firm governance and predicts a 'race to the top' in firm-governance quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, such governance changes may be associated with higher rather than lower CEO pay as CEOs substitute away from private benefits. The model also provides an explanation for the observed correlation of CEO pay and firm governance based on CEO power. Finally, we discuss the optimality of introducing randomness in CEO hiring, for example, by evaluating CEOs based on qualitative characteristics, or soft skills, that are prone to diverse judgements.

Keywords: Ceo power; Moral hazard; Ceo compensation; Investor protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 J33 K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-fin and nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance (2013)
Working Paper: CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance (2006)
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