Concertina Reforms with International Capital Mobility

Pascalis Raimondos () and Udo Kreickemeier

No 5888, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We show that the standard concertina result for tariff reforms -- i.e. lowering the highest tariff increases welfare -- no longer holds in general if we allow for international capital mobility. The result can break down if the good whose tariff is lowered is not capital intensive. If the concertina reform lowers welfare it lowers market access as well, thereby compromising a second goal that is typically connected with trade liberalisation.

Keywords: Trade policy reform; International factor mobility; Welfare; Market access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F11 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
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Working Paper: Concertina Reforms with International Capital Mobility (2006)
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