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Imposed Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution

Mark Gradstein and Alberto Chong

No 5922, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and arguing that the period under the communist rule can be viewed as an ?experiment? in institutional imposition. We find, consistent with some earlier related work, that citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favour increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. Our conclusion is that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (that lasted for about fifty years) had a limited effect on preferences.

Keywords: Institutions; Markets versus state; Redistributional preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D30 I31 P30 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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