Descent Rules and Strategic Transfers. Evidence from Matrilineal Groups in Ghana

Eliana La Ferrara

No 6111, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Traditional descent systems can roughly be divided into patrilineal and matrilineal. In the latter, a man?s heir is not his own child but rather his sister?s son. The paper examines the implications of this social norm for the pattern of inter-vivos transfers using household level data from rural Ghana, where the largest ethnic group is traditionally matrilineal. In particular, it tests the predictions of a model of strategic behaviour according to which children should respond to the threat of disinheritance by increasing transfers to their parents during lifetime to induce a donation of land before the default (matrilineal) inheritance is enforced. I find that the credibility of customary norms enforcement, as proxied by the presence of a nephew in the father?s household, significantly increases the probability of receiving transfers from children for Akans but not for other groups. The effect is specific to nephews and not to other co-resident boys. This pattern of behaviour can affect asset accumulation decisions across generations.

Keywords: Inter-vivos transfers; Matrilineal inheritance; Social norms; Strategic bequests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O16 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6111 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Descent rules and strategic transfers. Evidence from matrilineal groups in Ghana (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6111

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6111

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().