Is the Regulation of the Transport Sector Always Detrimental to Consumers?

Jacques Thisse, Gaigné, Carl and Kristian Behrens ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carl Gaigne

No 6185, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to qualify the claim that regulating a competitive transport sector is always detrimental to consumers. We show indeed that, although transport deregulation is beneficial to consumers as long as the location of economic activity is fixed, this is no longer true when, in the long run, firms and workers are freely mobile. The reason is that the static gains due to less monopoly power in the transport sector may well map into dynamic dead-weight losses because deregulation of the transport sector leads to more inefficient agglomeration. This latter change may, quite surprisingly, increase consumer prices in some regions, despite a more competitive transport sector. Transport deregulation is shown to map into aggregate consumer welfare losses and more inequality among consumers in the long run.

Keywords: Transport deregulation; Transport sector; Imperfect competition; Economic geography; Interregional trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F16 R12 R49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6185 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Is the regulation of the transport sector always detrimental to consumers? (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6185

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6185

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().