Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Wolfgang Leininger and Kai Konrad

No 6333, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.

Keywords: Collective action; Defence; Distributional conflict; Free-riding; Norms; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H11 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans (2007)
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