Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough

Chad Bown
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bernard Hoekman

No 6459, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal WTO trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce WTO rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the WTO is important to make trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. While our focus is on the WTO system, our arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.

Keywords: Developing countries; Dispute settlement; Enforcement; Trade agreements; Wto (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Developing countries and enforcement of trade agreements: why dispute settlement is not enough (2007)
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