Internationalization of NGOs and Competition on Markets for Development Donations
Thierry Verdier and
Gani Aldashev
No 6511, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
What are the effects of the integration of markets for private donations for development on NGOs? performance? How is the welfare of donors and beneficiaries affected? To answer these questions, we build a model of a market for development donations with horizontally differentiated NGOs competing by fundraising effort. We compare three regimes: autarky, full integration, and the regime of multinational NGOs (in which NGOs have to establish foreign affiliates to raise funds abroad). The welfare impact of market integration depends on the interplay between three factors: returns to scale in the NGO production technology, donors? "taste for variety", and the effectiveness of aggregate fundraising in motivating new donors.
Keywords: Ngos; Internationalization; Monopolistic competition; Non-distribution constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F23 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-dev
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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