No Trade

Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas Palfrey

No 6554, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We investigate, in a simple bilateral bargaining environment, the extent to which asymmetric information can induce individuals to engage in exchange where trade is not mutually profitable. We first establish a no-trade theorem for this environment. A laboratory experiment is conducted, where trade is found to occur between 16% and 32% of the time, depending on the specific details of the environment and trading mechanism. In most cases, buyers gain from such exchange, at the expense of sellers. An equilibrium model with naive, or 'cursed' beliefs accounts for some of the behaviour findings, but open questions remain.

Keywords: Bilateral bargaining; Experimental economics; No-trade theorem; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 O24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: No trade (2011)
Working Paper: No Trade (2008)
Working Paper: No Trade (2007)
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