Civil Wars and International Trade

Philippe Martin and Thierry Mayer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mathias Thoenig

No 6659, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between civil wars and international trade. We first show that trade destruction due to civil wars is very large and persistent and increases with the severity of the conflict. We then test the presence of two effects that trade can have on the risk of civil conflicts: it may act as a deterrent if trade gains are put at risk during civil wars but it may also act as an insurance if international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during civil wars. We find support for the presence of these two mechanisms and conclude that trade openness may deter the most severe civil wars (those that destroy the largest amount of trade) but may increase the risk of lower scale conflicts.

Keywords: Civil war; Trade; Globalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F51 F52 F59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-int and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (73)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Civil Wars and International Trade (2008)
Working Paper: Civil Wars and International Trade (2008)
Working Paper: Civil Wars and International Trade (2008)
Working Paper: Civil Wars and International Trade (2008)
Working Paper: Civil Wars and International Trade (2008)
Working Paper: Civil Wars and International Trade (2008)
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