Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees

Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn

No 6677, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a two-period model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal's initial utility is higher under transparency, because members exert more effort, which makes correct decisions more likely. The principal also benefits from transparency later, unless transparency leads to an alignment of the signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient committee members. In general, committee members are harmed by transparency.

Keywords: Career concerns; Committees; Experts; Information acquisition; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-knm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: Information acquisition and transparency in committees (2012)
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