Parental Sex Selection and Gender Balance

V Bhaskar

No 6876, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We consider a society where parents prefer boys to girls, but also value grandchildren. Parental sex selection results in a biased sex ratio that is socially inefficient, due to a congestion externality in the marriage market. Improvements in selection techniques aggravate the inefficiency. These results are robust to allowing prices in the marriage market, if the market is subject to frictions. We extend the model to consider gender preferences which depend upon family composition, allowing us to examine the possible sex ratio effects of China's one-child policy, and the implications of choice in societies where family balancing considerations are paramount.

Keywords: Congestion externality; Gender bias; Marriage market; Sex ratio; Sex selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 J13 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna
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