Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction

Achim Wambach

No 7023, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.

Keywords: Descending auction; Dutch auction; First price sealed bid auction; Information acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Information acquisition during a descending auction (2014)
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