The Strategic Determinants of U.S. Human Rights Reporting: Evidence from the Cold War
Nancy Qian and
David Yanagizawa-Drott
No 7026, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper uses a country-level panel dataset to test the hypothesis that the United States biases its human rights reports of countries based on the latters? strategic value. We use the difference between the U.S. State Department?s and Amnesty International?s reports as a measure of U.S. "bias". For plausibly exogenous variation in strategic value to the U.S., we compare this bias between U.S. Cold War (CW) allies to non-CW allies, before and after the CW ended. The results show that allying with the U.S. during the CW significantly improves reports on a country?s human rights situation from the U.S. State Department relative to Amnesty International.
Keywords: International relations; Political economy; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F5 N4 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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