Financial Signalling by Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs

David Audretsch, Bönte, Werner and Prashanth Mahagaonkar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Bönte

No 7165, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Innovative new ventures fail if they cannot attract resources needed to commercialise new ideas and inventions. Obtaining external resources is a central issue for nascent entrepreneurs - people who are in the process of starting new ventures. We argue in this paper that, a way to deal with this problem is to signal appropriability and feasibility of innovation to the financiers through patenting and prototyping activities, right in the early stages of the venture. We build a new dataset of over 900 nascent entrepreneurs with information on financing from conventional sources as well as business angels and venture capitalists. Our results suggest that patenting and prototyping increase the likelihood of obtaining external finance, especially equity. However, the most important determinant of debt is house ownership. This indicates that new start-ups need to protect their innovations and at the same time, should also prototype the intended product in order to obtain start-up finance. New ventures should therefore strategically use their innovativeness in order to obtain external finance.

Keywords: Innovation; entrepreneurship; Finance; Information asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G24 G32 L26 M13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-cta and nep-ent
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Financial Signaling by Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs (2009)
Working Paper: Financial Signaling by Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs (2009)
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