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International Taxation and Takeover Premiums in Cross-border M&As

Harry Huizinga, Wolf Wagner () and Johannes Voget

No 7182, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Cross-border M&As can trigger a higher international taxation of the target?s income. Non-resident dividend withholding taxes may be imposed by the target country, while additional corporate income taxation can be imposed by the acquiring country. Our evidence suggests that takeover premiums fully reflect non-resident dividend withholding taxes, while there is some evidence that they reflect corporate income taxation by the acquiring country as well. In contrast, acquiring firm stock market returns around the bid announcement do not appear to reflect either type of taxation. These results are consistent with previous findings that the gains of M&As primarily accrue to target shareholders.

Keywords: International taxation; Takeover premiums (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: International Taxation and Takeover Premiums in Cross-border M&As (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: International Taxation and Takeover Premiums in Cross-border M&As (2008) Downloads
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