Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility

Kai Konrad, Salmai Qari and Benny Geys

No 7216, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: For patriotic citizens, living in their native country is intrinsically preferable compared to living in the diaspora. In this paper, we analyze the implications of such a patriotic lock-in in a world with international migration and redistributive taxation. In a formal model of redistribution with international migration and fiscal competition we derive the main hypothesis: that countries with a more patriotic population should have higher redistributive taxes. Using ISSP survey data and combining them with OECD taxation data, we find robust evidence suggesting that a) higher patriotism is associated with higher tax burdens, and b) this relation is stronger for the upper-middle range of the income distribution.

Keywords: Fiscal competition; International mobility; Patriotism; Redistribution; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Patriotism, taxation and international mobility (2012)
Working Paper: Patriotism, taxation and international mobility (2012)
Working Paper: Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility (2009)
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