Financial liberalization and democracy: The role of reform reversals

Fabrizio Coricelli and Nauro Campos

No 7393, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The relationship between economic and political liberalization has received a great deal of attention lately, yet the possibility of a non-linear relationship and the role of reversals remain largely neglected. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, this paper offers evidence for a U-shaped relationship across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting using a wide range of estimators for various reform measures. We link this non-linear relationship to the notion of partial or captured democracy. We provide as well econometric support showing that even when de facto is modelled as a function of de jure financial liberalization, this non-linearity obtains.

Keywords: Economic liberalization; Financial reform; Political liberalization; Reform reversals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 O38 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7393 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Financial Liberalization and Democracy: The Role of Reform Reversals (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7393

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7393

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().