Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality

Gerard van den Berg and Vikström, Johan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Johan Vikström ()

No 7460, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Unemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction leads to a lower occupational level. The data cover the Swedish population over 1999-2004. We estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We use weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to deal with the fact the data register is large whereas observed punishments are rare. We also develop a theoretical job search model with monitoring of job offer rejection vis-a-vis monitoring of job search effort. The observation window includes a policy change in which the punishment severity was reduced. We find that the hourly wage and the number of hours are on average lower after a sanction, and that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses. Monitoring offer rejections is less effective than monitoring search effort.

Keywords: Case worker; Duration; Hours worked; Job offer; Offer rejection; Sanction; Search effort; Unemployment; Wage; Weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E65 H75 J30 J62 J64 J68 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7460 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality (2014)
Working Paper: Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality (2009)
Working Paper: Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7460

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7460

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().