Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements

Robert Staiger and Giovanni Maggi

No 7527, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to characterize the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a system of "property rights" or "liability rules." We then study how the optimal rules depend on the underlying economic and contracting environment. Our model also delivers predictions about the outcome of trade disputes, and in particular about the propensity of countries to settle early versus "fighting it out."

Keywords: Breach remedies; Dispute settlement; International trade agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D86 F13 K12 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements (2009)
Working Paper: Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements (2009)
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