Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent

Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Jérôme Danguy ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie ()

No 7631, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: For more than 40 years, governments and professional associations have acted, voted or lobbied against the implementation of the Community Patent (COMPAT). The econometric results and simulations presented in this paper suggest that, thanks to its attractiveness in terms of market size and a sound renewal fee structure, the COMPAT would drastically reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants while generating more income for the European Patent Office and most National Patent Offices. The loss of economic rents (?400 million would be lost by patent attorneys, translators and lawyers) and the drop of controlling power by national patent offices elucidate further the observed resistance to the Community Patent.

Keywords: Community patent; Maintenance rate; Patent systems; Patent cost; Renewal fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O34 O38 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent (2011)
Journal Article: Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent (2011)
Working Paper: Cost Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent (2009)
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