EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent

Jérôme Danguy () and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

No 7631, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: For more than 40 years, governments and professional associations have acted, voted or lobbied against the implementation of the Community Patent (COMPAT). The econometric results and simulations presented in this paper suggest that, thanks to its attractiveness in terms of market size and a sound renewal fee structure, the COMPAT would drastically reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants while generating more income for the European Patent Office and most National Patent Offices. The loss of economic rents (€400 million would be lost by patent attorneys, translators and lawyers) and the drop of controlling power by national patent offices elucidate further the observed resistance to the Community Patent.

Keywords: community patent; maintenance rate; patent cost; patent systems; renewal fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O34 O38 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7631 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent (2011) Downloads
Journal Article: Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Cost Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent (2009) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7631

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=7631

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-23
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7631