Incentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Evidence from Chile

Jan C. van Ours, Milan Vodopivec and Gonzalo Reyes Hartley

No 7632, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This study examines the determinants of job-finding rates of unemployment benefit recipients under the Chilean program. This is a unique, innovative program that combines social insurance through a solidarity fund (SF) with self-insurance in the form of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) - so as to mitigate the moral hazard problem of traditional unemployment insurance programs. Our study is the first one to empirically investigate whether UISAs improve work incentives. We find that for beneficiaries using the SF, the pattern of job finding rates over the duration of unemployment is consistent with moral hazard effects, while for beneficiaries relying on UISAs, the pattern is free of such effects. We also find that for benefit recipient not entitled to use the SF, the amount of accumulation on the UISA does not affect the exit rate from unemployment, suggesting that such individuals internalize the costs of unemployment benefits. Our results provide strong support to the idea that UISAs can improve work incentives.

Keywords: Savings account; Unemployment duration; Unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 H55 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive effects of unemployment insurance savings accounts: Evidence from Chile (2011)
Working Paper: Incentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Evidence from Chile (2010)
Working Paper: Incentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Evidence from Chile (2010)
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