The Institutional Foundations of China?s Reforms and Development

Cheng-Gang Xu

No 7654, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: China?s economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China?s institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve "China puzzle" this paper analyses China?s institution - a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas sub-national governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert and resist reforms, policies, rules and laws. China?s reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure.

Keywords: Authoritarianism; China; Decentralization; Economic development; Economic reform; Federalism; Institution; Political economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D86 E02 E62 G20 G30 H11 H70 K00 O10 O53 P36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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