Watchdog or Lapdog? Media and the U.S. Government
Nancy Qian and
David Yangagizawa
No 7684, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Abstract This paper investigates the extent to which strategic objectives of the U.S. government influenced news coverage during the Cold War. We establish two relationships: 1) strategic objectives of the U.S. government cause the State Department to under-report human rights violations of strategic allies; and 2) these objectives reduce news coverage of human rights abuses for strategic allies in six U.S. national newspapers. To establish causality, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in a country's strategic value to the U.S. from the interaction of its political alliance to the U.S. and membership on the United Nations Security Council. In addition to the main results, we are able to provide qualitative evidence and indirect quantitative evidence to shed light on the mechanisms underlying the reduced form effects.
Keywords: Development; Media; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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