Economic growth and the rise of political extremism: theory and evidence
Grüner, Hans Peter and
Brückner, Markus
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Markus Brueckner
No 7723, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
In many western democracies, political parties with extreme platforms challenge more moderate incumbents. This paper analyses the impact of economic growth on the support for extreme political platforms. We provide a theoretical argument in favor of growth effects (as opposed to level effects) on the support for extremist parties and we empirically investigate the relationship between growth and extremist votes. A lower growth rate increases the support for extreme political platforms but our estimates also indicate that extreme platforms are unlikely to gain majorities in OECD countries, unless there is an extreme drop in the GDP per capita growth rate.
Keywords: Economic growth; Political regimes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O40 O52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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