The geography of conflicts and free trade agreements

Philippe Martin and Thierry Mayer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mathias Thoenig

No 7740, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We analyze the interaction of economic and political determinants of free trade agreements (FTA). In addition to standard trade gains, FTAs can promote peaceful relations by offering a political forum and by increasing the opportunity cost of conflicts that disrupt trade. If policy makers believe in such pacifying effects of FTAs, country-pairs with large trade gains from FTAs and high probability of conflict are more likely to sign a FTA. Using data on the 1950-2000 period, we show that this complementarity between economic and political gains is at work in the geography of FTAs. Country pairs characterized by a high frequency of old wars - which we use as a proxy of the probability of conflict - are shown to be more likely to sign FTAs, the more so the higher the trade gains from a FTA. These trade gains are estimated by a theory-driven empirical strategy to disentangle them from the political factors. We also show that, contrary to old wars, recent wars make it more difficult to negotiate a FTA. This suggests the existence of windows of opportunity to lock-in FTAs and peace. Finally multilateral trade openness, because it reduces the opportunity cost of a bilateral conflict, increases the political incentive to sign FTAs.

Keywords: Free trading arrangements; Trade; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The geography of conflicts and free trade agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The geography of conflicts and free trade agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The geography of conflicts and free trade agreements (2010)
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