Bargaining cum Voice

Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller

No 7774, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other existing groups. Hypothetical outside options refer to hypothetical groups that are ultimately not formed. Articulation of hypothetical outside options in the bargaining process determines the relative bargaining power of the members of a group, which constitutes an instance of the power of voice. The adopted equilibrium concept, competitive equilibrium with free group formation and bargaining cum voice, endogenizes the outside options as well as the power of voice. We establish existence of such equilibria and we explore their properties.

Keywords: Articulation of outside options; Bargaining; Competitive equilibria; Group formation; Power of voice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D5 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04
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Journal Article: Bargaining cum voice (2011)
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