The role of fees in patent systems: Theory and evidence

Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Gaétan de Rassenfosse
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie ()

No 7879, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre-grant) fees and renewal (or post-grant) fees, depending on the structural context and on the policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of thirty patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age (to the notable exception of Switzerland and the U.S.).

Keywords: Application fees; Price elasticity; Patent system; Intellectual property policy; Renewal fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O30 O31 O38 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: THE ROLE OF FEES IN PATENT SYSTEMS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2013)
Working Paper: The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence (2010)
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