Incentives, resources and the organization of the school system

Samuel Berlinski and Facundo Albornoz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Cabrales

No 7964, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a model where student e ort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. We can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school eff ort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way we provide a rationale for the ambiguous existing empirical evidence on the e ffect of school resources. We also provide a novel microfoundation for peer e ffects, with empirical implications on welfare and on preferences for sorting across schools.

Keywords: Education; Parental effort; School resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 I21 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives, resources and the organization of the school system (2011)
Working Paper: Incentives, resources and the organization of the school system (2010)
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