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Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Alessandra Casella (), Aniol Llorente-Saguer () and Thomas Palfrey

No 7992, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction.

Keywords: Competitive Equilibrium; Experiments; Markets; Vote Trading; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D70 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
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Journal Article: Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (2010) Downloads
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